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VALUES AT WORK: 
HOW SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW MOVED 
FROM JOKE TO JUGGERNAUT IN 50 YEARS 
Kimberly A. Yuracko* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since Title VII was enacted fifty years ago,1 the scope of its sex 
discrimination protection has expanded dramatically.  When the Act was 
passed, its target was clear and fairly narrow.  It sought to end women’s 
exclusion from particular jobs and to challenge their relegation to a “pink 
collar” ghetto.2  In challenging these forms of categorical exclusion, the 
Act has been extremely effective.  In the decades that followed, 
discrimination has become more subtle and complex.  No longer are 
women categorically excluded from jobs, but their inclusion does require 
that they “fit” the corporate mold.  An employer might be happy to hire 
female lawyers, for example, as long as they do not appear too “macho” 
or masculine.  Challenges to workplace fit demands have been labeled 
“second generation” discrimination claims and have become a focal 
point of antidiscrimination litigation and scholarship.3 
In response to such claims, courts in recent years have interpreted 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in increasingly expansive 
ways.  Not only are workers protected from discrimination based on 
their biological sex, they are increasingly protected from discrimination 
based on the ways they express their gender identity.  Men perceived as 
inappropriately feminine, women perceived as inappropriately 
masculine, and transsexuals are winning protection from workplace 
demands that they conform to the dominant social norms of their sex.4  
                                                 
*  Stanford Clinton, Sr. and Zylpha Kilbride Clinton Research Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University School of Law.  I would like to thank Associate Dean Jeremy 
Telman for the invitation to give this lecture.  I am also grateful to the Valparaiso faculty 
and students for their engagement with the topic and for their insightful questions and 
comments.  This talk is based on a larger book project. 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2006). 
2 See Erica E. Hoodhood, Note, The Quintessential Employer’s Dilemma:  Combatting Title 
VII Litigation by Meeting the Elusive Strong Basis in Evidence Standard, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 111, 
114–15 (2010) (discussing the purpose behind Title VII); see also Keiko Lynn Yoshino, Note, 
Reevaluating the Equal Pay Act for the Modern Professional Woman, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 585, 590–
98 (2013) (discussing wage disparity claims under the Equal Pay Act, the predecessor to 
Title VII). 
3 See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination:  An 
Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006) (discussing trait 
discrimination, or “second generation” discrimination, under Title VII). 
4 See infra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (providing examples of such successful 
suits). 
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Yet, not all gender nonconformists are winning protection.  The result is 
a body of case law that is both on a trajectory of expansion, while still 
being something of a muddle.  In this talk, I seek to make sense of the 
values and social commitments that are driving contemporary sex 
discrimination case law, and I seek to raise a note of caution about its 
trajectory.   
To illustrate both the current muddle and the trajectory, I want to 
begin with a few somewhat stylized fact patterns based on actual cases. 
The Aggressive Woman:  Ann is a senior manager at a large 
accounting firm.  Ann works hard.  She is successful at winning new 
contracts for the firm and at advising clients.  Yet, when she is 
considered for promotion, she is denied admittance to the partnership.  
Some partners find her too aggressive and unladylike.  To improve her 
chance of promotion the following year, she is advised to dress more 
femininely, wear makeup and jewelry, and have her hair styled.  Ann 
sues for sex discrimination.  She wins.5 
The Effeminate Man:  Antonio works as a food server at a restaurant 
chain.  For several years, he is subjected to a steady stream of insults and 
name-calling from some of his male co-workers.  They refer to him using 
female pronouns and mock him for carrying his tray like a woman.  
Antonio complains about the harassment to his supervisor to no avail.  
Antonio sues for sex discrimination.  He wins.6  
The Transsexual:  Philecia is a transsexual police officer who has 
been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”).  As part of her 
transition from male-to-female, Philecia begins living off duty as a 
woman.  While still presenting as male at work, Philecia does display 
some feminine characteristics on the job.  She has a French manicure, 
arched eyebrows, and sometimes comes to work wearing makeup.  
Philecia is denied a promotion to sergeant.  In justifying the denial, one 
supervisor explains that she is not sufficiently masculine; she is criticized 
by several others for lacking “command presence.”  Philecia sues for sex 
discrimination.  She wins.7 
The Garden-Variety Gender Bender:  Darlene works as a bartender 
at a casino.  In order to protect its image, the casino has rigid and 
detailed grooming codes for female and male employees.  The code for 
female employees requires them to wear makeup, have their hair styled, 
                                                 
5 For the case on which the preceding scenario is based, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228 (1989); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
6 For the case on which the preceding scenario is based, see Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
7 For the case on which the preceding scenario is based, see Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 
401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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and wear nail polish.  The code for male employees prohibits them from 
wearing makeup.  Darlene does not object to any aspect of the grooming 
code for women, except for the makeup requirement.  She refuses to 
wear makeup and is fired.  Darlene sues for sex discrimination.  She 
loses.8 
These cases raise several questions.  Why do courts increasingly 
protect workers from discrimination based on their gender presentation 
in addition to their biological sex?  Why do some employees receive 
more protection from stereotypes than others?  In particular, why are 
transsexuals winning their challenges to sex-based gender conformity 
demands while garden-variety gender benders are not? 
In this talk, I seek to make two core arguments.  First, 
antidiscrimination law has always reflected a mosaic of principles and 
values rather than a single commitment or requirement.  It is the search 
for a single antidiscrimination principle that makes antidiscrimination 
law look particularly inconsistent and incoherent.  Second, the most 
recent expansion of protection for gender nonconformists is due to an 
increasing medicalization of gender in the courts.  Protection for 
transsexuals, in particular, has depended in large part upon courts’ 
acceptance of testimony by medical experts affirming the fixed, stable, 
and immutable nature of gender identification in workers who suffer 
from GID.  Such evidence, however, serves to essentialize not only the 
gender experience of transsexuals, but of women and men generally.  
Paradoxically, then, the current trajectory of expansion may be bringing 
new protections for individual gender nonconformists at the expense of 
a subtle hardening of gender expectations for everyone. 
My talk will proceed by examining the work being done by three 
quite traditional antidiscrimination values or commitments.  They are:  
(1) neutrality, (2) antisubordination, and (3) status protection.9  I will 
show the extent to which each value is driving the most recent expansion 
of sex discrimination protection.  I will then conclude by raising a note of 
caution about some of the unintended consequences the expansion in 
protection may have for sex equality, gender flexibility, and workplace 
freedom.10 
                                                 
8 For the case on which the preceding scenario is based, see Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
9 See infra Parts II–IV (analyzing these values in the context of Title VII sex 
discrimination claims). 
10 See infra Part V (posing potential issues with the expansion of Title VII sex 
discrimination law). 
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II.  NEUTRALITY 
The value that most clearly and firmly grounds American 
antidiscrimination law is “neutrality.”11  Women and men must be 
treated alike in the workplace because they are fundamentally, and in 
most respects, alike.  Antidiscrimination law’s demand for neutrality 
ended employers’ dual track hiring processes and gave women a road 
out of the pink collar ghetto.  Yet courts’ commitment to neutrality in sex 
discrimination cases has always been limited and partial for reasons both 
theoretical and practical.  As a result, neutrality demands have not been 
the driving force behind recent expansions in sex discrimination 
protection. 
Neutrality requires that women and men who are similarly situated 
be treated the same.  The question for determining whether treatment is 
non-neutral becomes in effect:  is a woman being penalized for 
possessing a trait that a man is not penalized for possessing and vice 
versa.  Yet, neutrality demands in sex discrimination cases are often 
more indeterminate and less useful than generally recognized. 
The problematic nature of cross-sex neutrality is most clear in cases 
where specific biological traits are at issue.  In such cases, determining 
whether an employer is behaving non-neutrally by comparing its 
treatment of women and men with precisely the same trait is not 
possible.  Findings of non-neutrality and discrimination must, therefore, 
depend on approximate cross-sex comparisons, which are themselves 
indeterminate and socially loaded. 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Class and Culture:  The Indeterminacy of Nondiscrimination, 5 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 17–18 (2009) (explaining that the nondiscrimination mandate is 
premised on the “simple sense of neutrality” that “directs one to treat likes alike”); Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 16 (2005) 
(explaining that Title VII’s “primary commitment [was] to equality and gender neutrality”); 
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of 
Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2325 (2006) (noting that “[b]road agreement across the 
political spectrum supports the concept of discrimination as colorblindness”); Kendall 
Thomas, The Political Economy of Recognition:  Affirmative Action Discourse and Constitutional 
Equality in Germany and the U.S.A., 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 329, 341 (1999) (describing the 
antidiscrimination principle as informed by the injunction that “likes must be treated 
alike”).  Legal scholars often refer to this demand for neutrality as an “anticlassification” 
requirement.  See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 955 (2012) (“[A]nticlassification principles prohibit 
practices that classify people . . . on the basis of a forbidden category.”) (internal quotation 
ommitted); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:  
Anticlassification of Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (explaining that the 
anticlassification principle “holds that the government may not classify people either 
overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category”). 
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Consider, for example, an employer who happily hires both women 
and men but refuses to hire women with high-pitched voices.  The 
employer has no problem hiring or promoting women; the employer 
simply finds female high-pitched voices grating and so refuses to hire 
women with such voices.  In order to determine whether a woman with 
a high-pitched voice is being discriminated against in the sense of being 
treated non-neutrally, it is necessary to compare her treatment to that of 
a man with the same trait.  Men, though, will not possess the very same 
trait.  Some men may possess high-pitched male voices, but none will 
possess a high-pitched female voice.  It is not possible, therefore, to 
assess the high-voiced woman’s sex discrimination claim by looking to 
the employer’s treatment of men with the very same attribute. 
Yet gender norms complicate neutrality determinations in all cases.  
In a gendered society, women and men can never possess the same trait 
in precisely the same way.  Gender norms will always make traits look 
and mean different things for women and men.  Traits such as 
competitiveness or active leadership, for example, are perceived very 
differently when possessed by women or men.12  In order to be 
operational, even in cases in which technical trait parity is possible, sex-
blind neutrality requires a rejection of gender norms.  Neutrality must be 
defined in a literal and formalistic way, without regard to the actual 
social meaning of the traits and attributes at issue. To use Professor Mary 
Anne Case’s colorful example, if women are free to wear “frilly pink 
dresses” at work then men must be free to do so as well,13 despite the 
fact that a frilly pink dress signals conservatism in a woman and 
transgression in a man. 
Courts, however, have never taken their commitment to neutrality 
this far.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis Uhlmann, Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead?:  
Status Conferral, Gender, and Expression of Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268, 273 
(2008) (finding that “[p]rofessional women who expressed anger were consistently 
accorded lower status and lower wages, and were seen as less competent, than angry 
men”); Doré Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female Leaders:  
Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 54–57 (1990) 
(finding that women who engaged in group leadership activities received more displeased 
responses and fewer pleased responses from group members than did men engaging in the 
same behavior and making the same suggestions and arguments); Laurie A. Rudman & 
Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 743, 757 (2001) (finding that female job candidates in a controlled study who 
emphasized “agentic” qualities such as competitiveness were rated “less socially skilled 
and likeable than an identically presented man”). 
13 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:  The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1995). 
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Co.14 provides the most high-profile recent example of neutrality’s legal 
limits.  Far from rejecting gender norms, the Ninth Circuit did not even 
seem to notice them.  It both upheld the requirement that women, but 
not men, wear makeup and proclaimed, without explanation, that the 
requirement did not reflect sex stereotypes at all.15  Yet in Jespersen, the 
Ninth Circuit was merely reaffirming a limit on neutrality that had been 
drawn by courts over the preceding four decades.   
Antidiscrimination law did not require formal neutrality between 
women and men with regard to dress and grooming codes, even in those 
instances where technical trait parallelism was possible.  Courts have 
consistently held, for example, that men with long hair need not be 
treated the same as women with long hair,16 and that men with earrings 
need not be treated the same as women with earrings.17  Courts have 
                                                 
14 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
15 Id. at 1105–06. 
16 See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
(holding that a male employee fired for not complying with employer’s short hair 
requirement for men could not state a claim for sex discrimination); Barker v. Taft Broad. 
Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a grooming code requiring men to 
maintain shorter hair length than women does not constitute a prima facie violation of Title 
VII); Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding a “sex-
differentiated hair length regulation” was permissible under Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle 
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that “requiring 
short hair on men and not women does not violate Title VII”); Willingham v. Macon Tel. 
Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Private employers are prohibited from 
using different hiring policies for men and women only when the distinctions used relate 
to immutable characteristics or legally protected rights.”); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 
F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding minor differences between men’s and women’s hair 
length in grooming regulations does not violate Title VII); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 
F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding “that a private employer may require male employees 
to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female 
employees” without violating Title VII); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the employer’s hair-length regulations did not violate Title 
VII). 
17  See, e.g., Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. CIV.A. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559, at *1–2 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2000) (holding that the employer’s grooming code allowing female, but 
not male, employees to wear earrings did not violate Title VII); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. 
Credit Union, No. 86 CV 1944, 1987 WL 9687, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (holding that 
the employer’s grooming code prohibiting men, but not women, from wearing earrings did 
not constitute sex discrimination); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 801, 
804 (Iowa 2003) (holding in response to a sex discrimination claim brought by a male 
employee fired for refusing to stop wearing an earring that “personal grooming codes that 
reflect customary modes” of distinctly gendered grooming do not constitute sex 
discrimination); Macissac v. Remington Hospitality, Inc., 811 N.E.2d 524, 524 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2004) (unpublished table decision) (holding that enforcement of a grooming code 
prohibiting male, but not female, employees from wearing earrings did not constitute sex 
discrimination); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 602 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
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viewed such burdens as too insignificant to warrant antidiscrimination 
protection.  Any principled commitment to neutrality has been 
outweighed in such cases by the perceived value of protecting 
comfortable gender conventions.   
Indeed, even when courts have protected workers from sex-specific 
conformity demands, a commitment to neutrality does not seem to be 
the reason.  Consider courts’ increasing willingness to protect 
individuals diagnosed with GID from sex-based dress and grooming 
demands.18  Under a principle of formal neutrality, it is impossible to 
distinguish between a man who wants to wear a dress or earrings 
because he suffers from GID and one who wants to do so because of a 
personal proclivity.  Yet this is precisely the distinction that courts make 
when they permit a man diagnosed with GID to transgress sex-based 
grooming codes but refuse to permit nontransexual men or garden 
variety gender benders to do so. 
Similarly, it seems unlikely that protection for effeminate men stems 
from a commitment to formal neutrality.  It is not at all clear, for 
example, that a man who is harassed for walking like a woman or acting 
like a woman is doing so in any real or technical sense.  Certainly it 
would be difficult to conclude that he is walking in precisely the same 
way as a female co-worker.  If neutrality toward men and women doing 
the same thing were driving antidiscrimination protection, it would be 
very strange for courts to provide protection in the effeminate men and 
masculine women cases, but not in dress and grooming code cases in 
which cross-sex comparators are more apparent and neutrality demands 
more clear.  Yet, again, this is precisely the distinction that courts 
currently make.  Such distinctions help to demarcate neutrality’s limits 
as an antidiscrimination commitment.  They also suggest that a principle 
other than neutrality is driving recent expansions of protection for 
gender nonconformists. 
III.  ANTISUBORDINATION 
American antidiscrimination law is committed to more than simply 
the neutral treatment of individual workers without regard to protected 
characteristics.  It is committed as well to dismantling particular caste-
like hierarchies that have been entrenched by pervasive historical 
discrimination.19  It is concerned, in other words, about groups, not just 
                                                                                                             
that the employer’s grooming code prohibiting male, but not female, employees from 
wearing facial jewelry did not constitute sex discrimination). 
18 See case cited supra note 7 (providing an example of such a case). 
19 See Areheart, supra note 11, at 964 (“Title VII—though seemingly designed to combat 
irrational discrimination and a statute that holds out the hope of moving beyond the 
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individuals.  Antisubordination values have shaped the doctrine and 
coverage of contemporary sex discrimination law, driving courts not 
only to require that women be given access to jobs, but also to require 
that certain jobs be redefined, and social norms shifted, so as to make 
their success more likely. 
Interestingly, although antisubordination ideals are most directly 
reflected in Title VII’s disparate impact framework—which prohibits 
facially neutral policies that operate to disadvantage a protected group 
while not serving a business necessity20—antisubordination goals have 
also shaped Title VII’s disparate treatment coverage.  In particular, 
courts’ willingness to permit non-neutral treatment of women and men 
in deference to socially salient gender norms has been tempered by 
courts’ concerns about group equality and relative access.21 
Within the disparate treatment framework, courts have expressly 
identified two tests that focus on and target harms to the group, rather 
than focusing solely on the individual.  The first is the unequal burdens 
test, which calls upon courts to strike down sex specific dress and 
grooming demands that disproportionately burden one sex.22  The 
second is the double bind test, which calls upon courts to reject sex 
specific dress, grooming, or behavior demands if they make it more 
difficult for workers of one sex to succeed professionally.23 
                                                                                                             
consideration of, for example, race—has also sought to effect the redistribution of resources 
through policies such as affirmative action, reasonable accommodation (in certain 
instances), and the disparate impact doctrine.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational 
Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 
838 (2003) (describing the goal of antidiscrimination law as “reducing subordination and 
social inequality”); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 11, at 32 (“To claim that the struggle for 
equality in this country has not been about subordinated groups seeking to dismantle the 
social structures that have kept them down makes a travesty of American history.  The 
moral insistence that the low be raised up—that the forces of subordination be named, 
accused, disestablished, and dissolved—is our story, our civil rights tradition.”). 
20 See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:  Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 911, 953–67 (2005) (discussing the history of disparate impact 
discrimination under Title VII); see also Leah M. Provost, Note, Excavating from the Inside:  
Race, Gender, and Peremptory Challenges, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 307, 324 n. 63 (2010) (“Title VII 
reaches facially neutral practices that have a disparate impact on a protected group . . . .” 
(citing, in part, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988))). 
21 See cases cited supra notes 16–17 (providing examples of courts that have upheld 
employer grooming regulations that treat men and women differently). 
22 See infra Part III.A (discussing the unequal burden test used as an alternative to 
disparate treatment).  
23 See infra Part III.B (discussing the double bind test used as an alternative to disparate 
treatment).  
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A. Unequal Burdens 
Courts first articulated the unequal burdens test in the 1970’s to 
provide some check on sex-specific dress and grooming requirements 
that seemed to disadvantage one sex relative to the other.24  The test was 
used with great effectiveness in its early years to strike down sex specific 
employment demands in the airline industry.  For example, 
requirements that female flight attendants wear only contact lenses, 
while male flight attendants could wear either contacts or eyeglasses, 
and requirements that female flight attendants meet stricter relative 
weight requirements than male flight attendants fell as courts 
emphasized that the burdens imposed on female workers were 
disproportionate and unequal to those imposed on male workers.25 
B. Double Bind 
The double bind test, by comparison, was articulated most famously 
by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.26  The test addresses 
and targets workplace gender performance demands that conflict with 
professional role demands.  In Price Waterhouse, the employer had 
created a double bind by demanding that Ann Hopkins be demure and 
ladylike, when successful performance of her job as a manager required 
more traditional male attributes such as assertiveness and 
competitiveness.27  The Supreme Court refused to allow Price 
Waterhouse to punish Hopkins for deviating from its feminine ideal.28  
Instead, it shielded Hopkins from this double bind, thereby facilitating 
her move up the corporate ladder.  As the Court explained:  “An 
employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions 
require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 789–90 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in 
part, vacated in part, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding employer policies that placed 
certain restrictions only on female employees violated Title VII). 
25 See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 847, 857 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding a 
weight policy inflicted only on female employees violated Title VII); Gerdom v. Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding a weight policy applicable only to 
female employees violated Title VII); Laffey, 366 F. Supp. at 789–90 (holding a policy 
restricting only female employees from wearing glasses and imposing weight restrictions 
on only female employees violated Title VII). 
26 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see infra text accompanying note 29 (providing the double bind test 
articulated by the Supreme Court). 
27 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (describing the traits displayed by the female 
employee in the office).   
28 See id. at 258 (holding that when a Title VII plaintiff proves an employment decision 
was based on gender, the defendant may only avoid liability by proving it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not considered the plaintiff’s gender). 
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22:  out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do 
not.  Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”29 
Double-bind concerns of the sort articulated in Price Waterhouse help 
to explain courts’ willingness to strike down gender conformity 
demands that sexually objectify female workers.  Courts check 
sexualization demands in a range of different cases.  While their reasons 
for doing so are poorly articulated, the double-bind principle provides a 
unifying thread. 
First, courts check sexualization demands in cases in which women 
are harassed as a result of their objectification.  Rather than simply hold 
employers liable for the harassment, courts routinely deny them the 
power to objectify their female employees in the first place.  For example, 
in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp. the district court would not permit a New 
York City office building to sexualize its female lobby attendant by 
requiring her to wear a revealing uniform.30   
Courts also check such demands in cases in which only female 
workers are held to a sexualized ideal.  Consider again the airline cases 
in which courts struck down dress and appearance requirements for 
female flight attendants.31  While these are often thought of as unequal 
burdens cases, broad double-bind concerns may also be at work. 
Finally, courts check sexualization demands in cases in which 
employers seek to add sexual titillation as a job requirement for 
otherwise mainstream nonsexualized jobs, and to engage in explicitly 
sex-based hiring.  In In re. Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State Division of 
Human Rights, for example, a New York appellate court refused to allow 
a Ramada Inn to “sex up” its restaurant by firing its male waiters and 
replacing them with scantily clad female waitresses.32 
It is not impossible for female flight attendants, waitresses, and 
lobby attendants to perform the technical functions of their jobs while 
looking sexy—particularly if the employer prevents actual harassment.  
Nonetheless, satisfying sexual objectification demands may make 
satisfying nonsexualized job demands more difficult for female workers 
in two ways.  First, sexualization demands may distract women from the 
nonsesexualized aspects of their jobs and diminish the energy they have 
left to devote to them.  Second, sexualization demands may distract 
customers and coworkers and diminish their perceptions of the 
competence of female workers. 
                                                 
29 Id. at 251. 
30 507 F. Supp. 599, 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
31 See cases cited supra note 25 (providing examples of such cases). 
32 360 N.Y.S.2d 937, 937 (App. Div. 1974). 
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Certainly, courts do not seek to eliminate female sexuality or the 
female gaze object from all jobs.  They recognize that women’s bodies 
and appearance may be an important part of the experience being sold in 
many service sector jobs.  Nonetheless, broad double-bind concerns may 
help explain why courts are particularly suspicious of sexual 
objectification demands for female employees and why they use Title VII 
to keep sex out of many jobs and minimized in others. 
Concerns about relative group advantage and disadvantage 
permeate sex discrimination jurisprudence in ways that are both explicit 
and unspoken.  Certainly courts have not interpreted Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination to require substantive workplace 
equality between women and men.  Nonetheless, concerns about relative 
group power in and access to the work world have led courts to 
challenge some social norms and reconstruct certain job descriptions.  
Yet, the changes have been highly context dependent.  Gender 
conformity demands may be struck down in one workplace while 
identical demands may be upheld in another because the broader 
implications of the demands play out differently in the different 
contexts—female bartenders may be required to wear makeup, but 
female professors probably could not be.  Despite these limits, the impact 
of courts’ antisubordination concerns has been sweeping, gaining 
women access to jobs throughout the economy and encouraging a critical 
take on social gender norms. 
IV.  STATUS 
Yet, the most significant and dramatic recent expansions of Title 
VII’s sex discrimination protection—those protecting individual 
workers’ gender expressions—do not stem either from courts’ 
commitment to neutrality or antisubordination.  They seem to flow 
instead from courts’ concerns about status-based harms combined with a 
new medicalization of gender that serves to essentialize and ossify not 
only the biological aspects of sex, but also the social and cultural 
meanings of gender. 
American antidiscrimination law not only prizes neutrality and 
seeks to undermine group subordination, it also cares about the 
particular ways in which workers are burdened and constrained.  Indeed 
central to antidiscrimination jurisprudence is the distinction between 
status and conduct—with burdens on the former being viewed as far 
more deserving of antidiscrimination protection than burdens on the 
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latter.33  Certainly, gender expressions, even those that seem to be the 
product of GID, do not reflect status in the narrowest sense of ascriptive 
status.  Ascriptive status is determined at birth, is not easily changed, 
and is independent of individual conduct.34  However, individuals who 
are discriminated against because of their gender expressions are 
targeted precisely because of their conduct, not independent of it. 
Yet the Supreme Court has also recognized a broader definition of 
status.  According to the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, status 
also refers to those conditions that an individual has a lack of ability to 
change and a lack of responsibility for acquiring.35  It is this broader 
definition of status, along with courts’ increasing reliance on expert 
medical testimony regarding gender, that helps explain courts’ 
expanding protection for workplace expressions of gender identity. 
Consider, for example, courts’ newfound willingness to provide 
antidiscrimination protection for transsexuals.36  Such protection has 
                                                 
33 See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality:  The Failure of the Religious Accommodation 
Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 353 (1997) (“For the most part . . . a line 
between status and volitional conduct separates employer actions that are prohibited by 
Title VII from those that fall under the discretion of the employer, outside of Title VII’s 
scope.”); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:  Discrimination by Proxy 
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1200−01 (2004) (describing the 
“involuntary/voluntary or ‘status/conduct’ distinction in Title VII cases”); Charity 
Williams, Note, Misperceptions Matter:  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Protects 
Employees from Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 357, 
360 (“Immutable traits are characteristics of status, whereas mutable traits are considered 
conduct, and ‘only discrimination based on status is forbidden.’” (quoting Engle, supra, at 
431)); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[S]ince sex, like race and 
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, 
the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their 
sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that “[t]he EEO Act does not prohibit all arbitrary employment practices.  It 
does not forbid employers to hire only persons born under a certain sign of the zodiac or 
persons having long hair or short hair or no hair at all.  It is directed only at specific 
impermissible bases of discrimination—race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . . Save 
for religion, the discriminations on which the Act focuses its laser of prohibition are those 
that are either beyond the victim’s power to alter . . . or that impose a burden on an 
employee on one of the prohibited bases.”  (footnotes omitted)). 
34 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (“[T]he legal status of 
illegitimacy . . . is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not 
within the control of the illegitimate individual . . . .”); Weber, 406 U.S. at 176 (suggesting 
heightened scrutiny is triggered by discrimination based on “status of birth”); RICHARD 
THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE:  A CRITIQUE 2 (2005) (arguing that civil rights law 
“properly focuses on ascriptive racial status, not on a metaphysics of ancestry or the 
unplumbed depth of subjective identity”). 
35  370 U.S. 660, 662−63 (1962). 
36 See case cited supra note 7 (providing an example of such decision). 
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depended upon the medicalization of GID and expert testimony 
regarding the pain one would experience as a result of this condition if 
one were forced to alter a particular gender expression.37  By focusing on 
the individual’s pain, the medical testimony has helped establish a 
judicial perception of transsexualism as a condition beyond one’s control 
to change. 
The importance of such medical evidence was most pronounced in 
the case of Doe v. Yunits, which involved a claim of sex discrimination in 
education rather than employment.38  Doe was a fifteen-year-old student 
who had been diagnosed with GID.39  Although biologically male, Doe 
identified as female and often wore girls’ clothes, makeup, and 
accessories to school.40  On such occasions, the principal would send Doe 
home to change.41  At the start of the next school year, Doe was told that 
she would not be permitted to enroll if she wore any girls’ clothing or 
accessories to school.42  Doe sued for sex discrimination and filed a 
motion for preliminary injunction.43  In concluding that Doe had shown 
a likelihood of success on her sex discrimination claim, the court relied 
on medical testimony and stated that forcing Doe to come to school in 
boys’ clothes would actually “endanger her psychiatric health.”44 
In recent employment discrimination cases involving transsexuals, 
medical evidence has played a similar role.  For example, in Smith v. City 
of Salem, the first circuit court decision to use the sex-stereotyping theory 
to protect a transsexual worker under Title VII, the court emphasized 
that the plaintiff suffered from GID and that his female gender 
expression through dress and grooming was part of the accepted 
medical treatment of his condition.45  As in Yunits, this information 
seemed important to the court because it reinforced that, for Smith, 
cross-dressing was not a voluntary choice but a medical necessity—one 
that could be avoided only with great pain and hardship.46 
                                                 
37 See infra text accompanying note 38–44. 
38 No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at *2. 
43 Id. 
44 Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend, Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947, at *6 
(Mass. Super. Feb. 26, 2001). 
45 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). 
46 See Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human:  Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law?, 
20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 179 (2005) (“Although the [Smith] court did not say so 
explicitly, this medical authority seemed to influence the court in seeing Smith’s behavior 
as pursuant to trustworthy medical advice, and therefore less her fault or choice.”). 
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Judicial concern about protecting immutable or status-like gender 
expressions—but not those that are mutable and conduct-like—also 
helps explain why transsexuals are winning their challenges to sex-based 
grooming requirements while nontranssexuals are not.  Transsexuals are 
beginning to win because they are able to convince courts that, for them, 
sex-based grooming demands are painful.47  In contrast, nontranssexual 
gender benders lose precisely because courts view the burdensomeness 
of such conformity demands as trivial for them.48 
Concerns about status harms and compliance costs also helps makes 
sense of courts’ protection of men harassed because of their perceived 
effeminacy.  Typically, such men are harassed not because of a simple 
discrete trait that they can easily change and undo.  Instead, they are 
harassed because of how they walk, talk, and stand—traits that are 
largely unconscious and difficult to alter.49 
Certainly employees do not always win simply by showing that a 
particular employment practice burdens a type of gender expression that 
is difficult for them to change.  However, when employees can show that 
such status-like gender traits are at issue, a presumption of protection 
does seem to attach, and to overcome the presumption an employer 
must present a business justification for the gender conformity 
demand.50  Status-like expressions of gender are being protected, in other 
words, not absolutely, but through a burden-shifting framework. 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Lie v. Sky Publ’g Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397, at *2, *5 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (holding plaintiff made a prima facie case of sex discrimination 
where the plaintiff was diagnosed with GID, the treatment of which involved 
psychotherapy and hormones).  The court in Lie explained: 
The plaintiff avers that she is a biological male who has desired to live 
as a woman for a number of years, that she has been diagnosed with 
gender identity disorder, that she engages in psychotherapy, and that 
she takes hormones as part of her treatment. . . . Consequently, the 
plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish she is a transsexual, not 
simply a man who prefers traditionally female attire. 
Id. at *2. 
48 See, e.g., Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) 
(“[H]air length is not an immutable characteristic, for it may be changed at will.”); Pecenka 
v. Fareway Stores, Inc. 672 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Iowa 2003) (“Wearing an ear stud is not an 
immutable characteristic.”). 
49 See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating 
that plaintiff suffered harassment for walking and carrying a tray like a woman); Doe v. 
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998) (stating the 
plaintiff’s coworkers referred to him as “the ‘fag’ or the ‘queer’” because he wore an 
earring). 
50 See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
employer presented “legitimate” concerns about potential liability from having a biological 
male use women’s public restrooms which justified its prohibition on transsexual employee 
doing so). 
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V.  CAUTIONS 
I want to conclude my talk by raising a note of caution about the 
expanding conception of gender as status that has been used so 
effectively in recent years to broaden the scope of Title VII’s sex 
discrimination protection.  Certainly, courts’ willingness to treat some 
expressions of gender as more immutable and status-like than others, 
and to award antidiscrimination protection as a result, has brought 
important and much needed protection to previously excluded 
individuals and groups.  There are, however, risks in expanding Title 
VII’s coverage by relying on the Act’s concern with status harms. 
Most obviously, the focus on status-like expressions of gender means 
that those whom I refer to as “garden variety gender benders” will 
(continue to) lack antidiscrimination protection.  Male workers who are 
generally comfortable with their masculinity will not be protected if they 
want to express their feminine side through dangling earrings or nail 
polish in violation of their employer’s grooming code for men.  Female 
workers who are generally comfortable with their femininity will not be 
protected if they want to express a more masculine side by rejecting such 
adornments in violation of their employer’s grooming code for women.  
Such workers will be unable to convince courts that noncompliance 
reflects some essential gender core rather than more transient personal 
preference.  Without new medical evidence to the contrary, courts will 
continue to view noncompliance for such casual gender benders as a 
matter of personal taste, and compliance as relatively painless. 
What may be less clear, and more pernicious, however, is that the 
focus on whether gender expressions are status-like may actually 
reinforce gender stereotypes and encourage highly gender-stereotypical 
behavior in the workplace.  To prove that a gender expression is status-
like—and that its abandonment would have high compliance costs—
employees must demonstrate that the attribute at issue is a core part of 
their gender identity.  An attribute looks more central and essential the 
more it fits within a coherent gender package.  As a result, in the quest 
for protection, gender-bending workers have an incentive to exaggerate 
their gender dysphoria by conforming those traits about which the 
worker feels less strongly to the gender of the traits for which the worker 
seeks protection.  The result, somewhat oddly, is that workers may adopt 
a more extreme gender dysphoria than they actually feel, and manifest 
this dysphoria through more consistent and coherent expressions of the 
gender code associated with the opposite sex. 
Moreover, the pressure on plaintiffs to prove their gender 
expressions are immutable not only encourages a particular kind of 
gender performance, it actually entrenches a particular understanding of 
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what it means to be gender female and gender male.  Reliance by courts 
on the medical definition of GID to understand how transsexuals 
experience their gender offers the clearest example.  In order to receive a 
diagnosis of GID, transsexuals must experience and express a strong 
commitment to the gender norms typically associated with the other sex.  
Those who do not experience transsexualism in the prescribed ways will 
either be (newly) pathologized or discredited.  Either way, they are likely 
to be excluded from the current antidiscrimination framework.  Those 
who seek to avoid such exclusion must articulate, if not actually 
experience, their gender in the ways courts say that they do. 
Courts’ reliance on a medical narrative about transsexualism, 
however, reifies not only transsexualism, but also gender more 
generally.  When medical experts testify that a plaintiff suffers from GID, 
the experts are saying something not only about transsexualism, but also 
about femininity and masculinity more generally.  Judicial acceptance of 
such accounts gives them particular social power.  Consider, for 
example, the court’s acceptance of the medical evidence presented effort 
in Yunits—the case involving the middle school boy who came to school 
in girls’ clothing.51  According to the court, a diagnosis of GID meant that 
“Doe ha[d] the soul of a female in the body of a male.”52  Having the soul 
of a female meant that Doe needed to wear stereotypically female 
clothing, and that coming to school in boys’ clothing would “endanger 
her psychiatric health.”53 
If, however, courts believe that women have female souls and that 
such souls require women to wear stereotypically feminine clothing, 
then the pain of women who seek to challenge some but not all feminine 
gender conventions will always be invisible.  Similarly, the alleged pain 
or discomfort caused to women in nontraditional jobs may be too easily 
believed by courts, making them far too willing to accept employers’ 
claims of a lack of interest defense in cases where women are excluded 
from nontraditional jobs. 
Perhaps even more troubling, however, is that judicial conceptions 
of gender may in fact become real and come to affect how people view 
themselves, what they aspire to, and what they ultimately accomplish.  
Those who identify as gender female may, for example, come to believe 
that they really are and must be most comfortable in skirts and makeup.  
Hence they may shy away from jobs that require masculine attire and 
                                                 
51 See text accompanying notes 38–44 (discussing the Yunits case). 
52 Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend, Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947, at *1 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001). 
53 Id. at *6. 
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dirty physical labor.  Those who identify as gender male may come to 
believe that they really are and must be aggressive and competitive.  
Hence they may shy away from jobs requiring nurturing and caregiving.  
Legal scripts do have the power to shape the actual lives of women and 
men. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The changes brought about by Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination have indeed been dramatic.  No longer are women 
excluded from broad segments of the work world.  They compete, 
instead, on roughly the same terms as men.  The focus of Title VII 
litigation has shifted from challenging exclusions based on sex to 
challenging those based on gender identity and expression.  Increasingly, 
individual gender nonconformists are winning protection from 
particular gender conformity demands.  Yet their victories have 
depended heavily on an increased medicalization of gender, which 
actually serves to narrow and ossify gender categories for all workers.  
As courts increasingly treat an individual’s femininity or masculinity as 
fixed, stable, and legally meaningful, they are also potentially redrawing 
the social boundaries that limit and define workers’ lives.  No longer 
does sex define the aspirations and future possibilities of girls and boys 
in the ways it once did.  The danger, at present, however, is that gender 
will come to circumscribe life choices and possibilities in the ways sex 
once did. 
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